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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The Distributional Impact of The Jobs and Growth Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003: A Longitudinal Study 
of the Marriage Penalty Tax. 
(December 2004) 
Frederick J. Feucht, B.S., Drexel University 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. L. Murphy Smith 
   Dr. Robert H. Strawser 
 
 
This dissertation quantifies the magnitude of the marriage penalty tax and 
measures its distributional effects on the general population. Estimates of the marriage 
penalty tax were calculated based on the effects of the most recent tax act on all 
taxpayers according to class of income. The study measures the distribution of the 
marriage penalty tax using income tax data for the year 2000 and projects changes that 
result from the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003. Data for 
analysis was obtained from the Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income (SOI) 
database and the Census Bureau’s year 2000 Current Population Survey (CPS) database. 
On signing the new tax act, President Bush said that the current tax code frequently taxes 
couples more after they get married and that the marriage tax contradicts American 
values and any reasonable sense of fairness. However, even after passage of the new tax 
act, results of the study indicate that while the marriage penalty tax is reduced, it 
continues to negatively affect the American family. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The marriage penalty tax has been a heated topic of discussion and debate by 
politicians, academicians, researchers, legislators, and, of course, individual taxpayers 
ever since Congress allowed a husband and wife to file an income tax return using the 
‘married filing jointly’ status in 1913.   A marriage penalty tax occurs when the total tax 
liability incurred by a married couple on their combined income is greater than that 
which would be calculated had they filed as separate/single individuals.  To engender 
public trust, tax policy must be fair and equitable and policy makers must consider 
political, equitable, as well as social implications in the formation and subsequent 
modification of tax law. 
The objective of this study is to investigate empirically the impact of recent 
changes in tax law to determine if, in fact, the new tax act truly accomplishes what 
Congress and the President intended.  To fully evaluate the impact of the new tax law, 
one must accurately identify the distributional effects of the new law on each income 
class of taxpayers. The results of this study will enable policy makers and tax researchers 
to assess the net impact of changes in newly instituted tax policy on income 
redistribution regarding the marriage penalty tax in the United States of America.  This 
study extends the previous marriage tax literature by empirically assessing the impact of  
_____________________     
This dissertation follows the style and format of The Accounting Review. 
  
2
 
recent changes in tax law on the marriage penalty tax.   
The study attempts to answer the question: Does the new tax act fundamentally 
reduce the negative societal impact created by the marriage penalty tax? Further, the 
study considers the effects on and consequences of the marriage penalty tax to society as 
a whole. 
On June 7, 2001, President George W. Bush signed into law The Economic 
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA 2001) asserting that, 
among other changes, this Act was intended to reduce the marriage penalty tax.  Relief 
was to be administered in two forms – a phase-in of an increase in the standard 
deduction for married couples and expansion of the income subject to the 15 percent rate 
(an amount equal to twice that of single taxpayers).  However, the phase-in schedule for 
the increase in the standard deduction was delayed – not to begin until 2005 (at 174% of 
the single standard deduction) and gradually increasing to 190% in 2008.  The expanded 
15% rate bracket for married couples filing joint returns will increase from 180% of the 
single bracket in 2005 to 200% in 2008 and thereafter.    
On May 28, 2003, in an effort to spur a lagging economy, President Bush signed 
the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA 2003) into law.  
JGTRRA 2003 accelerates many of the provisions of the EGTRRA 2001 and also 
increases the child care tax credit, doubles the standard deduction for married couples 
(temporarily), and attempts to address the inequity of the marriage penalty tax. 
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In a recent address to the Nation, President George W. Bush stated:  
My tax cut plan is not just about productivity, it is about people.  Economics is 
more than narrow interests or organized envy.  A tax plan must apply market 
principles to the public interest.  And my plan sets out to make life better for 
average men, women, and children.  The current tax code is full of inequities.  
Many single moms face higher marginal tax rates than the wealthy.  Couples 
frequently face a higher tax burden after they marry.  High marginal tax rates act 
as a tollgate, limiting the access of low and moderate-income earners to the 
middle class.  The current tax code frequently taxes couples more after they get 
married.  This marriage tax contradicts our values and any reasonable sense of 
fairness [emphasis added] (White House 2003).  
With the enactment of the above two most recent pieces of significant tax 
legislation, President Bush has thus asserted that the burden of the marriage tax in the 
American tax system will be reduced substantially.  As noted accounting scholar Dr. 
William R. Kinney (2003) appropriately stated, “In policy related research, if the 
government says something is true, we, as accounting researchers, should test to see if it 
actually is true.”   
This study utilizes aggregate data from the Statistics of Income (SOI) department 
of the Internal Revenue Service (2004). The data consists of actual income tax returns 
filed by married filing joint taxpayers for the year 2000. Additionally, census data as 
maintained by the Census Bureau’s year 2000 Current Population Survey (CPS) is 
utilized to allocate consistently the various items of income, expenses, dependency 
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deductions, credits, and other items (Census Bureau 2000). This aids in extrapolating 
data necessary to calculate and compare the marriage penalty tax before and after the 
recent tax law changes. Research questions are designed to address whether recent tax 
legislation enacted by the Bush administration does, in fact, significantly reduce the 
marriage penalty tax. 
This study is of significance to legislators, policy makers, researchers, and 
individual taxpayers.  Additional exploration and discussion of these tax law changes is 
strongly encouraged in order to derive a clearer view of their impact on taxpayers’ 
family situations.  The availability of more current income tax data, significant shifts in 
spousal employment trends, and recent changes in tax legislation suggest that knowledge 
of the marriage penalty tax should be updated accordingly.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Chapter II provides 
background and literature review.  Chapter III presents the research design and 
hypotheses development.  Chapter IV describes methodology.  Chapter V presents the 
data and analysis.  Chapter VI includes discussion of the benefits of providing incentives 
for intact families.  Chapter VII summarizes the conclusions and offers ideas for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
 
 
 This chapter includes discussion on the history of the marriage penalty tax, tax 
rate schedules and standard deduction information, and a literature review of prior 
empirical research.  
History of the Marriage Penalty Tax 
Marriage tax penalties (bonuses) arise when the total tax liability incurred by a 
married couple on their combined income is greater (less) than that which would be 
calculated had they filed as single/separate individuals.  However, calculating the net 
marriage penalty or bonus can be difficult in certain circumstances.  Researchers have 
long studied marriage penalty/bonus questions and found that several assumptions must 
be made regarding the division of the various pockets of income to estimate closely the 
amount of tax liability a married couple would have incurred had they been permitted to 
file as two single/separate individual taxpayers.   
Numerous factors contribute to the disparity in tax liabilities between individuals 
filing as single versus married filing jointly.  Tax rates, tax brackets, allowable standard 
deductions, child care credits, and other factors all cause a shift in tax liabilities.  The 
intricacies of the earned income tax credit and the various phase-in/out thresholds further 
complicate analysis.  Essentially, while holding income and investment decisions 
constant, research has shown that the act of getting married by itself accounts for a 
disparity in an individual’s income tax liability.  While married couples may face 
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differences in overall cash-flow outlays or spending not encountered by single 
individuals, this study will limit its investigation to the disparity (i.e., marriage penalty 
tax) which arises due to marital status.  In addition, the social costs associated with the 
marriage penalty tax will be considered.  
McIntyre and McIntyre (1999) reflect that marriage penalties have been in place 
since the adoption of the modern federal income tax in 1913.  At that time, a personal 
exemption of $3,000 was granted to a single person and $4,000 (or $2,000 per capita) to 
a married couple.  Thus, a single individual received a personal tax exemption which 
was $1,000 or fifty-percent greater than that of a married individual.  In 1948, most 
significant marriage penalties were temporarily eliminated with the adoption of full 
income splitting for married couples.  The Revenue Act of 1969 reintroduced marriage 
penalties by abandoning full income splitting in favor of marital joint filing with partial 
income splitting.  The Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced significantly most marriage 
penalties, primarily by a substantial reduction in tax rates.  The Revenue Reconciliation 
Acts of 1990 and 1993 increased marriage penalties for high-income married couples 
while lowering marriage penalties for some low-income married couples with children.  
However, the 1990 and 1993 tax acts increased penalties for many other low-income 
couples with children through the imposition of limitations of income on earned income 
tax credits (EITC).   
Tax Rate Schedules and the Standard Deduction 
 The U.S. employs a voluntary income tax system based on progressive rates.  
That means that once taxable income is properly derived, the rate of tax increases as 
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taxable income increases.  Taxability in the U.S. subjects four classes of taxpayers 
(married filing jointly, married filing separately, single, and head of household) to 
progressive gradient levels, or brackets, of tax rates as found in the Internal Revenue 
Service tax rate schedules.   
 Additionally, to arrive at taxable income, Congress allows taxpayers a deduction 
for specific expenses (itemized deductions) paid throughout the tax year for medical 
costs, certain taxes, mortgage interest, charitable contributions, casualty losses, job 
expenses, and certain expenses incurred in connection with the production or collection 
of income (reportable on Federal Form Schedule A).  For those taxpayers who do not 
have sufficient expenses in which they can deduct on Schedule A, Congress allows a 
standard deduction, a different amount to each class, to each group of taxpayer in lieu of 
claiming their actual itemized deductions.  Thus, taxpayers have a choice: they may take 
a deduction for their actual itemized expenses or for the standard deduction applicable 
for that tax year, whichever is greater.  Congress views the allowance of the standard 
deduction to the taxpayers as an efficiency technique useful in minimizing subsequent 
tax administration since the deduction is deemed to be de minimis in nature.  Exhibit 1 
shows tax rate schedules and standard deductions allowed for income tax years 2000 and 
2003 (post JGTRRA 2003).  
 In general, the marriage penalty tax arises due to disparity in the bracketed 
amounts of the graduated tax rate schedules as well as in the standard deductions 
allowed for married vs. non-married taxpayers, ceteris paribus.  Since the tax rate 
brackets and standard deductions for married couples filing jointly are not exactly twice 
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that as allowed for single individuals, a difference occurs and that difference tends to 
create a penalty for the couple filing as married jointly.  President Bush, with the newly 
enacted JGTRRA 2003, attempts to mitigate this disparity, at least temporarily, in the 
lower brackets by setting the brackets of the married joint tax rates equal to twice that of 
the single taxpayer for the first two tax rate levels (10% and 15%).  However, disparity 
is evident once again when one compares the subsequent four tax rate brackets for each 
class of taxpayer.   
Regarding the standard deduction, for tax years 2003 and 2004, Congress allows 
the married filing joint taxpayer a deduction equal to twice that of the single person yet, 
in subsequent years the comparability of the deduction falls to 174% in year 2005, 
slowly gaining to 200% in year 2009, again, creating an inequality between the 
taxpayers.  Interesting to note is that Congress will allow these reductions in the 
marriage penalty tax to ‘sunset’ or expire after the year 2010.  Why is there a sunset 
provision?  Perhaps Congress wants to evaluate the impact of the tax law prior to 
proposing a substantial reduction in or eventual elimination of the marriage penalty tax 
once and for all.  Academic research can help resolve this issue.    
Prior Empirical Research 
Historically, interpretations of marriage tax penalties (bonuses) vary greatly from 
study to study.  To gain an understanding of the perceived magnitude of the topic area, 
McIntyre and McIntyre (1999) state that Congress’ estimates of total elimination of the 
marriage penalty tax would cost approximately $42 billion per year (stated in 1998 
dollars).  Bull et al. (1999) in a study conducted by the Office of Tax Analysis find that 
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marriage tax penalties (bonuses) were more easily defined than could be accurately 
measured.  Brozovsky and Cataldo (1994) state that there is a current trend toward 
increasing the marginal tax rates and, should this trend continue, it will eventually lead 
to subsequent increases in the marriage penalty tax.  Wiggins et al. (1986) determine that 
marriage tax penalties are incurred primarily by middle- and upper- income couples.  
Yet recent research shows that marriage penalties are incurred by all classes of 
taxpayers, and may even affect low-income couples most of all (Whittington and Alm 
2001; Cook et al. 2001; Smith et al. 1999). 
Research of the marriage tax has expanded to related areas.  Studies have 
examined the impact of tax and transfer programs on social behavior, analyzed how 
changes in tax policy affect individual behavior, and attempted to quantify the true costs 
to society.  Alm and Whittington (1995) explored how changes in the marriage tax affect 
the probability of marriage or divorce using time-series analysis.  Smith et al. (1999) 
examined the effect U.S. tax policies have on marital stability – more specifically, how 
anti-family provisions (e.g., marriage penalty tax) affect the welfare of American 
families.  Gelardi (1996) investigated the timing of marriages in relation to tax law 
changes and found that a proposed change in tax law prompted a significant drop in the 
relative number of marriages occurring in the last half of one year and led to an 
unusually high increase in the first half of the subsequent year concluding that changes 
in tax laws do affect individual behavior.   
Since marital filing status for federal income tax purposes is determined on the 
last day of the calendar year, some couples planning to marry may actually plan for the 
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event to take place pre- or post- January 1.  Strategically, if only one person of the 
couple earns income, the marriage would benefit by arranging the ceremony on or before 
December 31 whereas, if both individuals earn income, they could avoid the marriage 
penalty tax by considering a post-January 1 wedding, ceteris paribus. 
 Researchers agree that many factors affect the imposition of the marriage penalty 
tax (bonus). Among these factors are the current tax rate schedules, standard deduction, 
child care credit, earned income tax credit, alternative minimum tax, and individual 
family situations. 
In an effort to quantify the net effect of the marriage penalty tax throughout the 
various changes in tax law, many prior studies have empirically calculated average 
marriage tax penalties and marriage tax benefits (a benefit of lesser tax paid by married 
couples vs. that paid by two single taxpayers, ceteris paribus) among all the income 
groups per bracketed amount.  After comparing the net penalty with the net benefit, a 
“real” net penalty was calculated.   Exhibit 2 reports a summary of the net marriage 
penalty tax for the period 1980 – 1999. 
Consistent with prior research, Holtzblatt and Reberlein (2000) measured the 
effect of the earned income tax credit (EITC) on marriage tax penalties and bonuses by 
employing a ‘resource pooling’ measurement method using the Treasury Department’s 
Individual Tax Model (a micro-simulation model based on the Statistics of Income 
sample of tax returns for 1995). They measure the effect on the married filing jointly 
income tax returns for the 2000 tax year (stratifying the results into five classes by 
adjusted gross income) and, subject to various assumptions, estimate that marriage tax 
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penalties will increase by at least $3.1 billion (10.4 percent) while marriage bonuses will 
decrease by $439 million (1.5 percent).  The most notable detrimental effect on marriage 
penalties occurs in those situations where couples find that they are ineligible for EITC 
because their combined incomes exceed $30,000 (maximum phase-out). 
Feenberg and Rosen (1995) utilized a Tax Simulation Model (TAXSIM) 
maintained by the National Bureau of Economic Research to test a stratified random 
sample (96,589) of actual tax returns filed in 1989 and ‘aged’ the data using a nominal 
per capita income growth (consistent with the Congressional Budget Office predictions) 
to 1993/1994 levels.  Further, since the original data did not indicate the division of the 
earnings by couples, the researchers divided family earnings between the husband and  
wife using assumptions and data collected from the March 1990 Current Population 
Survey (CPS) thus separating the joint liability of the couple into two separate liabilities.  
Assumptions were made for the division of passive income, dependents, and other 
factors between the spouses.  They found that the new law will cause some married 
couples to incur approximately $33 billion in additional tax penalties while other 
married households will receive approximately $27 billion in tax subsidies.  They 
extrapolate their findings to the population and conclude that, on-average, fifty-two 
percent of American families will be paying $1,244 in marriage taxes while another 
thirty-eight percent of the families should receive $1,399 in marriage subsidies. 
 The U.S. Congressional Budget Office (1997), using 1996 tax data, found that 
among married couples, there was a significant rise in two wage-earner households in 
the last two decades. The CBO found also that there was a trend of increasing equality of 
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the incomes of husbands and wives, particularly in households with higher incomes, thus 
contributing to a substantial increase in the share and the magnitude of couples incurring 
marriage tax penalties. The CBO estimated that 42 percent of couples had an average 
marriage penalty tax of roughly 2 percent of adjusted gross income (range 7.6% - 1.6%) 
with higher estimates calculated if itemized deductions and dependents were awarded to 
the higher income spouse (based on a hypothetical divorce). 
Prior research provides also for discussion on how changes in tax policy affects 
the behavior of individuals and their decision to marry or not to marry, such as, how the 
marriage penalty affects single couples contemplating marriage (or possible 
postponement – temporarily or permanently) and/or married couples contemplating 
divorce.  Moffit et al. (1998) find strong evidence that economic considerations in the 
welfare system favor unmarried individuals thereby encouraging low-income partners to 
cohabitate rather than formally marry, which results in socially detrimental 
consequences on children (such as higher school dropout rate and higher teen pregnancy 
rate).  
Sjoquist and Walker (1995) examined the impact of the marriage tax on the rate 
and timing of marriage, as did Alm and Whittington (1995, 1996, and 1999). Alm and 
Whittington (1999) extrapolate that an increase in the marriage penalty tax by a mere 
$465 would decrease the probability of a first-time marriage for women in a low-income 
couple by approximately 3% whereas, wealthy professional couples experiencing up to a 
99% increase in the marriage penalty tax could experience a decrease in the probability 
of first-time marriage for the female partner as much as 23%.   
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Researchers also attempt to identify and quantify the “true” long-term cost to 
society associated with changes in public policy and measure the impact of those 
changes on human behavior.  Smith et al. (1999) provide an analysis of the impact of 
societal ethics, cultural trends, divorce law and public policies on the institution of 
marriage.  They posit that public policy (i.e., tax and transfer programs) may affect 
marital stability and they state that one would expect government policy makers to be 
more pro-child, pro-family (or at least neutral) and should advance legislation that 
promotes the family.  Estimates are that marriage penalties cost American couples and 
families approximately $33 billion in the year 2000.  This is an explicit tax cost that can 
be identified as being borne by married taxpayers and their families.   
Researchers are continually trying to ascertain the ‘true’ cost to society, that is, 
the other costs paid by the American taxpayers to support governmental programs on 
federal, state, and local levels.  For instance, studies have shown that children raised in 
single-parent homes have a higher probability for negative social outcomes such as 
under-education, delinquency, and incarceration (Demuth and Brown 2004; Olshewsky 
et al. 2001; Smith et al. 1999). Consequently, this places an increased burden on society 
to contribute funds necessary to support the public and private organizations that 
maintain related rehabilitation programs and infrastructure. Can a reduction in or the 
possible elimination of the marriage penalty assist in changing human behavior? 
Research suggests the answer is yes.  
Some researchers posit that public policy can change human behavior. In 
previous studies, unfavorable tax consequences of being married were associated with 
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divorce and lower marriage rates (Smith et al. 1999; Keely 1987).  One explanatory 
theory behind these findings is simply that the extra tax burden is a financial stress, and 
as such causes marital difficulties that can contribute to divorce.  Again, the damaging 
effect of the marriage penalty would be greater in a lower income family where the 
dollar amount has greater weight relative to all available resources. Along these lines, 
the marriage penalty tax not only discourages contemplated marriages, but also presents 
a danger to existing marriages.  
A consequence of the marriage penalty is that it encourages a single-parent (or 
divorced) rather than married family condition for the taxpayer. Compounding the 
problem, the tax code provides financial incentives to taxpayers to have children outside 
of marriage. A favorable filing status, child credit, and a higher scaling of the EIC, all 
are available to the single taxpayer as a result of having children. As such, the current 
tax system promotes a single-parent family over a two-parent family. Given the negative 
social outcomes associated with single-parent families, this is an illogical and 
presumably unintended consequence of the current tax system. Elimination of the 
marriage penalty tax would be a step toward correcting this problem. 
If we look to the nature of the earnings distribution within families to determine 
which couples specifically incur the marriage penalties, we find that in instances where 
both couples are earning roughly similar levels of incomes, these couples actually pay a 
higher tax collectively (higher than two individuals filing as single).  In families where 
the married spouses have larger differences between husband and wife earnings, the 
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marriage penalty tax is less than in instances where the husband and wife earn similar 
amounts of income.  
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
 
The research objectives of this paper are to determine whether a shift in the 
amount and the distribution of the marriage penalty tax (bonus) occurs between the tax 
laws established prior to the Bush administration (i.e., the tax laws in effect before the 
EGTRRA 2001tax act) and the changes recently enacted by the new JGTRRA 2003 tax 
act.  By obtaining aggregate data from actual income tax returns filed for the year 2000, 
directional sign predictions are made based on the changes expected by using the criteria 
from the most recent tax act.  Research methodology is similar to that employed by 
Feenberg and Rosen (1995).  A decrease in the amount and the distribution of the 
marriage penalty tax is anticipated as a result of the recent tax act.   
In addition to the changes enacted by JGTRRA 2003, a shift in the proportion of 
families that are two-wage earning couples will also affect the distribution of the 
marriage penalty tax.  Summary data of actual individual income tax returns filed for the 
year 2000 is available from the Statistics of Income (SOI) Division of the IRS.  Using  
the SOI data, the analysis will be useful to approximate and quantify the marriage 
penalty under the pre-2001 and 2003 tax acts and stratify the effect across the various tax 
rate brackets of married filing jointly tax payers.  Consistent with prior research, this 
study will use actual income tax return data and perform empirical testing based on the 
IRS’s SOI data.  Data will also be obtained from the 2000 Census Bureau Current 
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Population Survey (CPS) to evaluate the impact of the tax law changes on the marriage 
penalty tax in proportion to the CPS earnings.1   
The research questions are as follows, as stated in the alternate form: 
 
RQ1:  There will be a substantial real decrease between the net effect of the marriage 
penalty tax in year 2000 and the projected net effect of the marriage penalty tax 
as the result of JGTRRA 2003. 
 
With the passage of the new tax act, Congress specifically intended to focus on a 
substantial reduction in the marriage penalty.  Thus, Research Question 1 posits that 
there should be empirical evidence of a decreasing shift or complete elimination in 
marriage penalty situations resulting from the new tax act.   
 
RQ2:  There will be a substantial real decrease between the distribution of the marriage 
penalty tax in year 2000 and the projected distribution of the marriage penalty tax 
throughout all classes of jointly filed income tax returns as the result of JGTRRA 
2003. 
 
Research Question 2 addresses the distributional effects between the income 
brackets and looks to the fairness (e.g., horizontal equity) of the reduction in the 
marriage penalty.  If Congress truly intended to maintain horizontal equity amongst the 
various classes of income tax payers, there should be evidence of true parity between the 
taxpayers of similar classes of income.   
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
As described earlier in this paper, this study primarily utilizes aggregate data 
from the Statistics of Income (SOI) Division of the Internal Revenue Service and the 
2000 Current Population Survey (CPS) data as compiled by the U.S. Census Bureau.  
The SOI data consists of actual income tax returns, presented in aggregate form, as filed 
by married filing joint taxpayers for the year 2000.  Base year tax liabilities are 
calculated and verified using the tax law information in effect for the year 2000 and then 
compared to the tax liabilities as re-calculated under the newly-enacted JGTRRA 2003 
tax law.  Then, consistent with prior research, this study splits the income, deductions, 
and dependents of the married couple, according to various assumptions, as though a 
divorce occurs, and re-calculates the income tax liabilities of the couple as that of two 
separate single individuals.  
 Since SOI data does not contain information that is specific on the division of 
income and expenses between spouses, data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) 
is employed to allocate consistently the various items of income, expenses, dependency 
deductions, credits, and other items.  CPS data is provided on a monthly basis and is 
derived from a collaboration of data between the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the 
Bureau of the Census.  CPS data contains employment, earnings, and demographic data.  
Use of CPS data is important to this study since, when splitting the income and 
deductions between spouses, certain assumptions must be made.  Allocation assumptions 
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in earlier studies performed the division of the various individual tax items via a strategy 
whereby the dependents and deductions were awarded to the spouse with the higher 
income.  This study allocates dependency exemptions and deductions in accordance to 
the symmetry found in the CPS data.   
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CHAPTER V 
DATA AND ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 To better understand the where and the how of the detrimental effect(s) of 
the marriage penalty tax on specific family situations, Exhibit 3 shows the impact of the 
marriage penalty tax that occurs between one-wage earner and two-wage earner married 
couples filing jointly versus filing separately under various income splits, both couples 
with two dependents.   
Exhibit 3 illustrates how the changes in earnings ‘mix’ between Spouse 1 and 
Spouse 2, and the re-allocation of the dependents in the case of filing separately affects 
the distribution of the marriage penalty tax in each of the situations. The greatest 
detriment is borne collectively by the taxpayers in situations where the dependents are 
awarded to the second spouse who has little to no income and files as Head of 
Household – precisely the group of taxpayers that logically most need the additional 
financial resources.    
Olshewsky et al. (2001) in a study of education, employment, health costs, and 
crime levels (socioeconomic status) approximate, through a series of extensive 
extrapolations, that the elimination of the marriage penalties could, possibly, reduce the 
number of single-parent families by as much as 36%.  Thus, hypothetically, the 
government would give up the collection of $33 billion in marriage penalties but would 
save even more annually in curtailment of direct and indirect social program 
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expenditures (e.g. drug rehabilitation and prison facilities).  Of more importance is the 
success of the people, arguably a happier, more well-adjusted nation as a whole. 
Exhibit 4 sets forth an approximation of marriage penalty tax (bonus) for the tax 
year 2000.  Estimates of combined wages per taxpayer group were selected to represent 
taxpayers within each marginal income tax rate bracket for that tax year.  Marriage 
penalty tax (bonus) estimates are calculated for couples with two dependents filing as 
married filing jointly versus hypothetical alternative calculations should the couples 
choose to separate and file as single/head of household.  The two alternatives consider 
the allocation of the two dependents of the couple wholly to Spouse 2 (Alternative 1) 
and in another situation by awarding one dependent to each of the separated parents 
(Alternative 2).     
 Exhibit 5 provides a similar basic analysis of tax liabilities of married filing joint 
couples with zero dependents, presented by marginal income tax rate brackets for the tax 
year 2000, versus tax liabilities of those same taxpayers should they divorce and 
subsequently file as two separate single taxpayers.  Dependency exemptions were not 
included Exhibit 5 in order to isolate and identify only the effect of the substantial 
variance caused by the marriage penalty tax.  It can be noted in Exhibit 5 that married 
taxpayers who earn similar levels of income are significantly impacted by the marriage 
penalty tax.  Extreme variances are noted within the classes of income depending on the 
mix of income earned between the spouses.  
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To assess the net impact of the changes of the new tax act, this study calculated 
the differences in the net marriage penalty tax for the years 2000 and 2003.  Estimated 
tax rates for the year 2003 were employed based on the published rates announced post 
the May 28, 2003 tax act.  To calculate the net impact of marriage penalty or benefit to 
taxpayers in the various income tax brackets, intervals were established which matched 
the taxable income levels corresponding to the 2000 and 2003 income tax brackets.  
Taxable income for each interval was calculated first as Single taxpayers and 
secondly as Married Filing Jointly (MFJ) essentially “marrying” the two individual 
taxpayers (i.e., combined incomes as husband and wife).  Taxable income was calculated 
for each taxpayer group by deducting the personal exemption(s) and standard deduction 
allowed for each of the specific years from Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) and applying 
the tax rates in effect for those years.  This study also accounted for the Earned Income 
Tax Credit (EITC) that was allowable per year for each qualifying taxpayer.   
In an effort to maintain integrity of the findings and to later be able to extrapolate 
the effect of net marriage penalty tax to the population as a whole, this study chose 
combined income levels representative of comparable income tax brackets for 2000 and 
2003.  Using data obtained from the Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income (SOI) 
Division (Yau, et al. 2004), midpoints of the income intervals were chosen from the data 
to represent the average taxpayer for that group.  This data also provides the number of 
men and women who filed joint income tax returns in the year 1999, the corresponding  
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gross amount of income reported for each group, and thus, average salaries and wages 
for men and women taxpayers were calculated for each interval.   
Exhibit 6 presents an extrapolation of the Internal Revenue Service Statistics of 
Income data by income interval, number of men and women joint filing taxpayers, total 
income, and average income.  Exhibit 6 provides a percentage mix of the earnings 
between husband and wife in jointly filed income tax returns per income interval. 
The distributional effect between men and women was derived by hypothetically 
“marrying” the average male filing a joint income tax return with the average female 
who also filed a joint income tax return for each interval and subsequently calculating 
the proportionate share of earnings for the couple in each interval.  The measurement of 
this distributional ‘mix’ will better serve to allow for the calculation of marriage penalty 
tax for 2000 and 2003 so the results may be compared to prior research.  This will also 
allow for the net effect of the change in the tax law to be extrapolated to the population 
as a whole.  This improves on prior research that mostly use samples of tax returns filed 
while the current study uses aggregate data for all actual tax returns filed. 
Consistent with prior research, calculations were performed at the various 
marginal income tax brackets for the year 2000 in order to determine if a net marriage 
penalty tax or benefit exists within each income interval, and overall.  To calculate the 
income for the individuals that file on a single basis, income was split between the 
couples of each interval using the mix derived from the preceding distribution of wages 
information.  Exhibit 7 reports a summary of the marriage penalty tax in each of the tax  
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brackets for the year 2000 for a couple filing married filing joint versus the same couple 
filing Single, separately with zero dependents. 
As mentioned earlier, SOI data does not contain information that is specific on 
the division of income and expenses between spouses, thus various assumptions need to 
be made to assess the magnitude of the marriage penalty tax.  Initially, our tests were 
conducted using data found in the 2000 Supplementary Survey Profile of the U.S. 
Census Bureau.  Median earnings for male full time, year round workers was estimated 
at $38,244 (57% of the two-wage earner couple’s joint income) and median earnings for 
female full time, year round workers was estimated at $28,720 (43% of the two-wage 
earner couple’s joint income).  Additionally, the Census survey estimated that 
approximately 52.57% of all married couples have both the husband and wife in the 
labor force.  Simply using the 57% husband / 43% wife ratio to re-allocate the total 
income between the couples in the single tax calculations to calculate the marriage 
penalty tax within each tax rate bracket is too simplistic and its use will not provide a 
meaningful generalization to the population as a whole.  Thus, this study employs the 
income division percentages within each income interval to more accurately project the 
net marriage penalty tax. 
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Exhibit 8 reports the results of the marriage penalty tax for married filing joint 
couples with zero dependents using the new tax rates for the year 2003.  The findings 
indicate that the marriage penalty tax, while substantially reduced by the new tax act, is 
still very much evident in the lower and higher marginal tax rate brackets.   
 Exhibit 9 shows the difference between the marriage penalty (bonus) tax for the 
pre- and post- JGTRRA 2003 calculations.  As indicated earlier, income (combined 
wages) has been stratified by income intervals in each of the marginal tax rate brackets 
and; based on assumptions, marriage penalty amounts are evident throughout the tax 
brackets for years 2000 and 2003.  While a reduction in the net marriage penalty was 
noted for the year 2003, penalty amounts still exist within various marginal tax rate 
brackets.  The greatest reduction overall in married penalty amounts is noted in the 
middle-income brackets.  The smallest decrease in the marriage penalty took place in the 
lowest tax bracket ($113, a 16.9% reduction) and in the highest marginal tax bracket 
($3,859, a 29.4% reduction).    
 Exhibit 10 extrapolates the impact of results of the change in the marriage 
penalty tax, as calculated earlier for the years 2000 and 2003, to the population using the 
SOI data of the number of men and women joint filers per income interval.  The new tax 
act reduces the marriage penalty tax by approximately $41.9 billion, resulting in an 
overall marriage tax bonus of $4.2 billion.  While it appears that this is positive news for 
families; however, this benefit is only temporary as the new tax law changes reflect that 
the standard deduction for married couples electing to file jointly (currently 200% of that 
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allowed for single filers for tax years 2003 and 2004) will, again, be reduced to 174% 
beginning for tax year 2005.  Full parity between the single versus married filing jointly 
taxpayers is not scheduled to be realized by the married filing jointly tax payers until tax 
year 2009 (barring any further tax legislation) when the standard deduction for the 
married filing jointly taxpayers will be increased to 200% of that allowed for the 
taxpayers filing a Single. 
For situations in which couples in two-earner households have more evenly split 
incomes than the average, those couples will incur substantially higher marriage 
penalties.  For example, the average income split for the couple with combined wages of 
$37,500 is 63.7 percent for the husband and 36.3 percent for the wife (IRS 2003).  
However, there are couples with $37,500 of combined wages who have a 50-50 income 
split and would therefore incur an even higher marriage penalty tax.   
Based on the assumptions used in this study, testing of Research Question 1 
shows that there was a significant change (decrease) in the marriage penalty tax overall 
from the year 2000 to the year 2003 as the result of JGTRRA 2003.  The total change 
was calculated in Exhibit 10 and the impact of the change was extrapolated to the 
population by income interval.  The change resulted primarily from increased parity 
between the standard deduction amounts and tax rate bracket income levels for married 
filing joint versus single individuals.   
Testing of Research Question 2 reveals that while there has been a reduction in 
the marriage penalty amounts overall, significant disparity still exists among the various 
classes of income.  Differences between the marriage penalty amounts for each of the 
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marginal tax rate brackets for the year 2000 versus the year 2003 reveal that, on average, 
the net marriage penalty has decreased, even resulting in an overall net marriage bonus 
in the middle income tax rate brackets.  On the other hand, the marriage penalty was 
only moderately reduced in the lower and upper brackets, and the average couple in 
these brackets still pays a penalty.  Furthermore, depending on the income split between 
the working spouses, some couples in all the income brackets still incur a marriage 
penalty tax.  The closer the taxable income split between the spouses is to 50-50, the 
higher the marriage penalty tax will be.   
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CHAPTER VI   
IMPLICATIONS OF PROVIDING INCENTIVES FOR INTACT FAMILIES 
 
 
 
Interestingly, much tax policy research investigates the application of horizontal 
equity and how it applies across various income levels.  Horizontal equity refers 
conceptually to an idea of perceived fairness whereby ‘those with equal status or income 
should be treated equally.’  Hence, as it applies to taxes, taxpayers in similar classes of 
income should pay essentially the same amounts of total tax and should also be able to 
enjoy the same amounts of benefits.  These benefits conceivably are in the form of goods 
and services that taxpayers receive from the government.  Conceptually, a fair or 
equitable tax policy would be one in which the combined income of a married couple 
would yield the same tax liability as the combined income of two single individuals. 
However, this is not as simple as it may appear, as the calculations are complicated by 
other factors such as different tax rate brackets, dependents, and the EITC. 
The premise of a government’s duty of fiduciary care to its taxpayers and its 
responsibility to provide those taxpayers with the best utilization of collected revenues 
and minimization of overall costs forces one to consider many questions. In the case of 
the marriage penalty tax, what is the impact of the perceived fairness of the marriage 
penalty tax for providing incentives or disincentives to preserving an intact family unit?  
Related to this is the question of whether it is fair to allow married individuals to receive 
a so-called bonus, by allowing them to be taxed as if each earned exactly one-half of the 
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combined income (even when one taxpayer earned all the combined income of the 
couple). Ultimately, this is a question of social justice. 
What is just for society? The primary justification to eliminating tax 
disincentives and to providing tax incentives that encourage intact families is that 
married couples (husband and wife) provide the optimum environment for raising 
children, the next generation of taxpayers. In balancing the scales of justice, on one side 
are single taxpayers, who may call for equal taxation of income of all individual 
taxpayers, married or not. Applying this view would eliminate the married filing jointly 
option. This would eliminate the marriage penalty tax but also the benefits of taxing 
combined, and equally apportioned, income associated with the married filing jointly 
option.  
On the opposite side of the scales are the needs and rights of children. The 
evidence of human history, natural law, and current scientific studies reveal that the role 
of a mother and a father in the family are complimentary. Children raised in a two-parent 
home are several times more likely to avoid negative social outcomes such as under-
education (McLanahan 1996; Dawson 1991), violent crimes (Parker and Johns 2002), 
substance abuse (Deleire and Kalil 2002; Hoffman and Johnson 1998), incarceration 
(Jackson 1997; Morse 2003), and illegitimate births (Demuth and Brown 2004). 
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Under-Education 
In a testament on the positive benefits of maintaining an intact family (husband 
and wife) during childrearing, Princeton psychologist Sara McLanahan somberly states 
that children in one-parent families have poorer school attendance records and lower 
grade point averages then children raised in two-parent families.  The school dropout 
rate for children in single-parent families is twice that of children in two-parent families.  
Further, children from single-parent homes as less likely to graduate from college and 
are more likely to become single-parents themselves (McLanahan 1996).  McLanahan 
was a single parent herself for ten years.  Ironically, she developed an interest in this 
area of research in an attempt to support her conviction that single parents can do “just 
as good a job of raising children as married moms.”  In the end, she concluded that 
evidence overwhelmingly supports that, on average, children do much better when raised 
in two-parent families. 
Research has shown that children of broken homes perform less well in reading, 
spelling, and math.  They are more likely to repeat a grade, have higher dropout rates, 
and have lower rates of college graduation.  As compared to children from intact, two-
parent families, children from single-parent or broken homes exhibit more conduct 
problems, more symptoms of psychological mal-adjustment, lower academic 
achievement, more social difficulties, and poorer self-concepts (Massachusetts 2004).  
Dawson (1991), in her review of the National Health Interview Survey of Child Health, 
reported that “children from disrupted marriages were over seventy percent more likely 
than those living with both biological parents to have been expelled or suspended.”  
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Children from broken homes are twice as likely as children from intact families to drop 
out of school and are more likely to exhibit more health, behavioral, and emotional 
problems, are involved more frequently in crime and drug abuse, and have higher rates 
of suicide (Zill et al 1993). 
Violent Crimes 
Researchers have been studying the relationship between family structure and 
delinquency for years.  As far back as 1925, researchers interested in juvenile 
delinquency have found that almost twice the number of institutionalized (or delinquent) 
youths came from broken homes (Burt 1925).  Criminology literature reiterates that 
family is an essential source of community – providing stability and supervision to form 
a barrier against violence and that children from broken homes are more delinquent than 
those from intact families.  Parker and Johns (2002) posit that the family is a mechanism 
of social control and is the essential element needed for reducing crime in urban areas 
(specifically homicide).  They identify constructs of social control occurring in cases of 
family disruption (i.e., divorce and single-parent households).      
Substance Abuse 
In addition to experiencing lower educational achievement and higher crime 
involvement, studies have shown that children from broken or single-parent homes are 
more likely to engage in drug and alcohol abuse.  Deleire and Kalil (2002) explored this 
premise and, using data from the National Educational Longitudinal Study, observed that 
teenagers from single-parent families were more likely to initiate smoking or drinking, 
more likely to initiate sexual activity, and less likely to graduate from high school or to 
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attend college than were children from two-parent families.  Hoffman and Johnson 
(1998) concluded that children raised in traditional married-parent homes engaged in 
fewer harmful behaviors such as, delinquency, substance abuse, suicide, and premarital 
sex.  
Incarceration 
Research notes repeatedly that incarceration of one (or both) of the parents has 
particularly disastrous consequences to the future development of the children.  Colson 
(2003) states that more than half of the inmates in prison come from broken families as 
inmates typically lack the male and female role models.  These role models (father and 
mother) are the moral influences that inform the child’s consciences early in life; thus, 
any influence that causes family breakdown will increase crime and social disorder.   
In Parents or Prisons, Jennifer Morse (2003) speculates that for some people, 
prisons are substitutes for parents.  Obviously, prisons are a poor substitute for the love 
and guidance from two caring, nurturing parents.  As she states, without two parents, a 
child is more likely to end up in the criminal justice system at some point in their life, 
and the prison will perform the parental function of supervising and controlling that 
child’s behavior.  Basic development of self-control, reciprocity, conscience, trust, and 
empathy takes place inside the family.  Morse comments that a free society needs people 
with consciences.  The great majority of people must obey the law voluntarily.  If people 
fail to conform themselves to the law, someone will either have to compel them to do so 
or protect the public when they do not.  Thus, without two parents working together as a 
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parental team, the child has more difficulty learning the moral basics and may have to be 
rehabilitated, incarcerated, or restrained or re-trained.  
In her book, in a section titled “The Cost of Controlling People”, Morse (2003) 
provides an interesting, yet startling, analysis of the estimated cost of incarceration to 
society.  Using the state of California as an example, the Department of Corrections 
allocation accounted for approximately six percent ($5.2 billion) of the entire state’s 
budget in 2002-2003.  This equates to approximately $26,700 per adult inmate per year 
and about $49,200 per person per year for the juvenile justice system.  She poses an 
interesting question:  What if the minors in the juvenile system were functioning well 
enough that they could be a normal part of society and thus be a part of the educational 
system rather than the juvenile delinquency program – how much would this save the 
taxpayers?   
Morse (2003) extrapolates that the taxpayers pay about $8,568 per year per 
student K-12 and another $4,376 per student at a community college, or, at most, $17, 
392 if they were intellectually bright enough to attend the University of California 
system.  Trading school for prison is a tremendous savings for the taxpayers and 
everyone in society.  Of course, society receives many other benefits from reduced 
crime, e.g., the actual tangible economic savings from less theft and robbery, but also the 
intangible benefits of not being a victim hurt by crime or the freedom derived from 
living in less fear because criminal activity is reduced. 
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Illegitimate Births 
Current research shows, that more than one-half of children will spend some time 
in a single-parent family.  Demuth and Brown (2004), using data from the 1995 National 
Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health, estimate that nearly one-third of all children 
are born illegitimately to unmarried mothers.  Their study identified similar constructs 
through which living with a single parent increases delinquency and their results indicate 
that adolescents in single-parent families are certainly more likely to engage in more 
serious forms of negative behavior.   
Fourteen years ago, then-Vice-President Dan Quayle sparked controversy when 
he made a comment which criticized the main character of the television show Murphy 
Brown for having a child out of wed-lock (CNN 2002).  The show portrayed the trials 
and tribulations of a single-parent female role model and it prompted controversy 
regarding traditional family values and concerns of raising a fatherless child.  
McLanahan (1994) states that children who grow up with only one of their biological 
parents are disadvantaged across a broad array of outcomes.  These children are twice as 
likely to drop out of high school, two and a half times as likely to become teen mothers 
themselves, and one hundred-forty percent more likely to be idle (out of school and out 
of work) as are children who grow up with both parents.  She also adds that children 
from one-parent families also have poorer attendance records, lower grade point 
averages, lower college aspirations, and, as adults, they have higher rates of divorce.   
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To borrow a quote from the Massachusetts Family Institute on why marriage 
matters (Massachusetts 2004): 
The Massachusetts Family Institute stands firmly on the premise that the optimal 
way to raise healthy, successful citizens is through a family structure consisting 
of mother, father, and children.  While we recognize that there are caring families 
which for a variety of reasons are not structured this way, the great body of social 
science research, as well as rich historical, cultural, and religious traditions, 
support this premise.  There are many pressures and demands on today’s 
families, but the evidence, from social scientists, as well as cultural and religious 
history, is strong that marriage provides the intimacy and support that make for 
healthy individuals and a stable, successful society. 
 
McLanahan (1996) points out that out-of-wedlock births have been going up in 
the United States since the 1940’s and suggests that the government do more to help 
parents cover the costs of raising children.  She states emphatically that a better way to 
encourage marriage is to make sure that parents are not penalized when they do get 
married – our current system of income transfers and taxation does just that.  The 
question that must be addressed is why does the government continue to impose the 
marriage penalty tax. 
Eliminating the marriage penalty, and allowing a marriage bonus (i.e., taxing a 
married couple's combined incomes apportioned equally under the married filing jointly 
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option) results in social justice. Eliminating the marriage penalty tax strengthens the 
two-parent family and advances society's optimum way to raise future generations.  
Estimated costs to society associated with the criminal justice system, prison 
facilities, treating substance abuse, lost productivity, and under-education attributable to 
single-parent households have been estimated to exceed $300 billion (Olshewsky et al. 
2001). Eliminating the marriage penalty tax is expected to strengthen two-parent 
households and thereby reduce the number of children raised in single-parent 
households. 
Research overwhelmingly indicates the societal benefit of average two-parent 
households over average single-parent households on children.  In addition, the benefits 
of marriage extend beyond children’s well-being.  Psychologist Neil Warren indicates 
that numerous studies show that married persons are better off emotionally, physically, 
financially, and vocationally than are unmarried partners (Warren 2003).  Adults benefit 
from marriage, whether they become parents or not.  Essentially, strengthening marriage, 
by eliminating the marriage penalty tax, is beneficial to society regarding children and 
adults.   
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CHAPTER VII   
LIMITATIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 
 
 While researchers are able to calculate and measure the impact of a change in tax 
law on the marriage penalty tax among the various classes of taxpayers, it is difficult to 
ascertain the exact impact of the penalty on marriage itself.  Further, the division of 
income and deduction items found in this body of research is based on various 
assumptions and, as plausible as these assumptions may seem, they are nevertheless 
estimates for what could occur, not what will occur.  Additionally, in trying to estimate 
the overall true cost to society as the result of changes in tax law, it is difficult to 
extrapolate precisely those results to the population as a whole. 
The findings of this study will serve as an important contribution to the literature.  
Congress has voiced publicly its concern to the American taxpayers that it intends to 
substantially reduce the inequity of the marriage penalty tax.  Perhaps Congress can do 
so on a ‘net’ basis but apparently has been unable to accomplish this throughout all 
classes of income.  This study confirms that the marriage penalty tax exists still for many 
married taxpayers.   
On signing the new tax act, the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act 
of 2003, President Bush said that the current tax code frequently taxes couples more 
after they get married and that the marriage tax contradicts our values and any 
reasonable sense of fairness.  Survey data and anecdotal evidence indicate that most 
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people agree with President Bush.  However, as shown by this study, the marriage 
penalty tax was not eliminated, although it was substantially reduced by the new tax law.  
Results of this study indicate that while a significant reduction in the marriage 
penalty has been observed as the result of the newly enacted tax law, substantial 
disparity still exists throughout the various class of income.  The smaller benefit went to 
the income tax payers of the lowest and highest marginal income tax rate brackets and 
the greater proportional benefit to those taxpayers in the middle marginal income tax rate 
brackets.   
The family is widely regarded as the foundation of civilization (Colson 2003; 
Smith et al. 1999).  Considering the positive aspects of marriage on stable family 
structure, emotional health of children, and physical health of adults (with or without 
children), placing a higher tax burden on a married couple, simply because they are 
married, appears contrary to the best interests of society.  Some tax researchers may 
posit that while there are some couples who pay a marriage penalty, this is offset 
possibly by other couples who receive a marriage benefit.  This line of thought is 
analogous to a beekeeper carelessly dropping a beehive in a crowd of people and 
concluding that no problem exists because only a few people were stung; the majority 
walked (or ran) away unscathed.  Based on this research, one could infer that Congress 
via the marriage penalty tax is hurting marriage and the best interests of society, 
children, and adults. 
This study may stimulate further interest in determining how changes in tax 
policy affect people’s behavior such as the public and social costs associated with the 
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marriage penalty tax.  This study may be extended in the future by utilizing various 
assumptions for re-allocation of tax variables such as income, expense, and dependents.  
Division of these items may affect the impact of the changes to tax law.  Calculations 
involving the separation of the taxpayers from married to single/head of household may 
involve awarding the dependents to the highest wage earner, or to the wife, or splitting 
the dependents equally among the separating ex-spouses.  Similarly, income and expense 
items could be re-allocated amongst the separated taxpayers.  
If Congress wants to maintain revenue neutrality, then alternate sources of the 
revenue should be considered.  Researchers might find it interesting to investigate what 
other sources of tax revenue might replace the tax revenue that would be lost due to the 
minimization or elimination of the marriage penalty tax.   
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ENDNOTES 
 
1. As an alternative to obtaining the Tax Simulation Model data, Holtzblatt and Rebelein 
(2000) utilized data from the Treasury Department’s Individual Tax Model (ITM). 
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Exhibit 1 
 
Tax Parameters for Tax Years 2000 and 2003 
 
Tax Rate Schedules 
Taxable Income Brackets (in $1,000) 
 
Marginal                Head of 
Tax Rate MF-Joint     MF-Sep     Single       Household 
 
Year 2000 
15%  $  0 - 43.85  $  0 - 21.925            $  0 - 26.25      $  0 -35.15 
28%  43.85 - 105.95  21.925 - 52.975         26.25 - 63.55     35.15 -90.8 
31%  105.95 - 161.45  52.975 - 80.725         63.55 - 132.6     90.8-147.05 
36%  161.45 - 288.35 80.725 - 144.175      132.6 - 288.35   147.05-288.35 
39.6%  288.35 -   144.175 -            288.35 -   288.35 -    
 
Year 2003       (Post 2003 Tax Act, retroactive to 1/1/03) 
10%  0 - 14.0  0 - 7.0             0 -7.0   0 - 10.0 
15%  14.0 - 56.8  7.0 - 28.4            7.0 - 28.4 10.0 - 38.05 
25%  56.8 - 114.65  28.4 - 57.325          28.4 - 68.8 38.05 - 98.25 
28%  114.65 - 174.7  57.325 - 87.35          68.8 - 143.5 98.25 - 159.1 
33%  174.7 - 311.95  87.35 - 155.975       143.5 - 311.95 159.1 - 311.95 
35%  311.95 -   155.975 -          311.95 -   311.95 -  
 
Standard Deduction 
 
Year 2000 7,350 (167% of Single) 3,675     4,400  6,450 
 
         2003 9,500 (200% of Single) 4,750 (50% of MFJ=S)   4,750  7,000 
         2004  200%  
         2005  174% 
         2006  184% 
         2007  187% 
         2008  190% 
         2009  200% 
2010 200% 
 
Source: CCH Incorporated. 2003 Tax Legislation.  Law, Explanation and Analysis.  Chicago, IL. 
 
Author’s note:  Marriage taxpayers who itemize will not benefit from the increased standard deductions 
and, most likely, fewer married taxpayers will find it necessary to itemize. 
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Exhibit 2 
 
Net Marriage Penalty Tax  
Based on Prior Research 
 
Study / year published 
[tax act] 
Tax 
Year 
Average Penalty 
     %  and  $ 
Average Benefit  
     %  and  $ 
Net  
Penalty   
OTA 1999 1999 48 and $1,141 41 and $1,274  $31 
CBO 1997 1996 42 and $1,380 51 and $1,300 - 
CBO 1997 (all itemized) 1996 47 and $1,750 49 and  $1,350 - 
Alm and Whittington 1996 1994   $375* 
Feeberg and Rosen 1995 
[OBRA 93] 
1994 52 and $1,244 38 and $1,399 $124* 
Feeberg and Rosen 1995 1993 51 and $898 38 and $1,577 $(143)* 
Rosen 1987 [TRA 86] 1988 40 and $1,091 53 and $609 $119** 
Rosen 1987 1986   $529** 
Alm and Whittington 1996 1980   $300* 
     
   * 1994 dollars    and    ** 1988 dollars 
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Exhibit 3 
 
Impact of MPT (MBT) Within Classes of Income 
by Combined Wages, Two Dependents 
[2000 tax rates, includes effects of EITC and child tax credits] 
Married Filing Jointly vs. Separately 
   
 
Combined 
Wages 
 
Spouse 
1 
Spouse 
2 
Tax liab. 
M F Joint 
MPT or (MBT) in M F Joint tax 
liability vs. tax calc.  
under Alt. # 1 or Alt. #2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(in $1,000’s) 
Tax due 
(refund) 
Alt. # 1 
Single + 0 dep 
H of H + 2 dep 
 Alt. # 2 
H of H + 1 dep 
H of H + 1 dep 
$20,000 0 20 $ (2,343) $  0   (1,858) 
 5 15  1,406  1,346 
 10 10  1,150  2,363 
 15 5  (1,507)  1,346 
 20 0  (4,267)  (1,858) 
       
$30,000 0 30 484 555  (1,712) 
 7.5 22.5  2,321  2,547 
 15 15  2,706  4,444 
 22.5 7.5  1,195  2,547 
 30 0  (2,940)  (1,712) 
       
$60,000 0 60 5,221 (1,859)  (3,143) 
 15 45  521  2,755 
 30 30  3,521  4,829 
 45 15  1,438  2,755 
 60 0  (6,158)  (3,143) 
       
$120,000 0 120 22,206 (3,097)  (3,965) 
 30 90  2,552  2,746 
 60 60  3,747  5,478 
 90 30  810  2,746 
 120 0  (7,443)  (3,965) 
       
$240,000 0 240 64,303 (4,040)  (4,403) 
 60 180  7,632  9,800 
 120 120  9,351  11,961 
 180 60  6,541  9,800 
 240 0  (8,463)  (4,403) 
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Exhibit 4 
 
Impact of MPT (MBT) Within Classes of Income 
by Marginal Tax Bracket, Two Dependents 
[2000 tax rates, includes effects of EITC and child tax credits] 
Married Filing Jointly vs Separately  
       Note: Combined wage amounts selected to yield comparable marginal tax rate brackets per  
                 category (MFJ vs. Single). 
Marg. 
Tax 
Brack. 
% 
Combined 
Wages 
 
Spouse 
1 
Spouse 
2 
Tax liab. 
M F Joint 
MPT or (MBT) in M F Joint tax 
liability vs. tax calc.  
under Alt. # 1 or Alt. #2  
 
  
 
 
 
 
(in $1,000’s) 
Tax due 
(refund) 
Alt. # 1 
Single + 0 dep 
H of H + 2 dep 
 Alt. # 2 
H of H + 1 dep 
H of H + 1 dep 
15 % $40,000 0 40 $ 2,221 $ (555)  (1,475) 
  20 20  1,802  3,191 
  40 0  (3,558)   
        
         
        
28 % $100,000 0 100 16,113 (3,167)  (3,951) 
  50 50  3,254  4,985 
  100 0  (7,344)   
        
        
        
31 % $160,000 0 160 34,971 (2,732)  (3,645) 
  80 80  4,784  6,543 
  160 0  (8,350)   
        
        
        
36 % $280,000 0 280 79,993 (3,718)  (3,758) 
  140 140  12,530  15,251 
  280 0  (7,274)   
        
        
        
39.6% $600,000 0 600 207,357 (2,662)  (2,662) 
  300 300  21,410  24,919 
  600 0  (6,171)   
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Exhibit 5 
 
Impact of MPT (MBT) Within Classes of Income 
by Marginal Tax Bracket, No Dependents 
[2000 tax rates, includes effects of EITC and child tax credits] 
Married Filing Jointly vs Separately  
            Note: Combined wage amounts selected to yield comparable marginal tax rate brackets per  
                      category (MFJ vs. Single). 
 
Marg. 
Tax 
Brack. 
% 
Combined 
Wages 
 
Spouse 
1 
Spouse 
2 
Tax liab. 
M F Joint 
MPT or (MBT) in M F Joint tax 
liability vs. tax calc.  
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
(in $1,000’s) 
Tax due 
(refund) 
If both taxpayers 
file 
Single + 0 dep 
 
15 % $40,000 0 40 $ 4,061 $ (1,718) 
  20 20  213 
      
       
      
28 % $100,000 0 100 18,681 (4,776) 
  50 50  1,524 
      
      
      
31 % $160,000 0 160 36,707 (6,614) 
  80 80  2,193 
      
      
      
36 % $280,000 0 280 80,598 (7,274) 
  140 140  8,073 
      
      
      
39.6% $600,000 0 600 207,357 (6,171) 
  300 300  17,901 
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Exhibit 6 
 
Distribution of Wages Between Husband and Wife in Dual Wage-Earner Families 
 
 
 
Men, joint filers Women, joint filers Distribution of
Income Average Average avg earnings in
Interval Salaries Salaries 2 wage-earner
by Size Number of Total $ * and Wages Number of Total $ * and Wages MFJ households
$ of AGI *** taxpayers (in $1,000's) $ taxpayers (in $1,000's) $ Husb Wife
Under 5K ** 269,185 3,625,359 13,468 276,000 2,116,731 7,669 63.7% 36.3%
10,000 1,400,760 11,073,920 7,906 1,208,996 7,768,129 6,425 55.2% 44.8%
20,000 2,725,002 39,239,895 14,400 2,266,236 22,613,860 9,979 59.1% 40.9%
37,500 9,892,261 255,574,311 25,836 8,247,782 121,485,004 14,729 63.7% 36.3%
75,000 15,668,855 681,871,934 43,518 13,868,379 349,627,413 25,210 63.3% 36.7%
150,000 5,197,754 407,510,131 78,401 4,359,367 172,925,267 39,668 66.4% 33.6%
300,000 854,387 146,544,803 171,520 571,900 33,817,488 59,132 74.4% 25.6%
600,000 657,630 156,859,555 238,523 409,501 29,042,946 70,923 77.1% 22.9%
1,000K or more ** 136,077 151,594,427 1,114,033 57,928 14,424,850 249,015 81.7% 18.3%
Overall averages 36,801,910 1,853,894,334 50,375 31,266,089 753,821,689 24,110 67.6% 32.4%
  (all intervals)
* Monetary amounts are in thousands of dollars, averages are in whole dollars.
** Disregarded interval due to unknown variance (range from $5,000 to negative and above $1,000,000 are indeterminate).
*** Source: Data derived from "Comparing Salaries and Wages of Women Shown on Forms W-2 to Those
      of Men, 1969-1999", p.283, IRS, SOI Jan. 2004.
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Exhibit 7 
 
Impact of MPT (MBT) Within Classes of Income 
by Marginal Tax Bracket, No Dependents 
[2000 tax rates] 
Married Filing Jointly (MFJ) vs Separately (as Single)  
 
 
2000 
Marg. 
Tax 
Brack. 
% 
Combined 
Wages 
 
Spouse 
1 
 
Husband 
 
(% split)* 
$ split 
Spouse 
2 
 
Wife 
 
(% split)* 
$ split 
Tax liab. 
M F J 
 
 
 
Tax due 
(refund) 
MPT or (MBT)  
 
M F J vs Single  
  
 
Assume both taxpayers file 
Single + 0 dep 
      
  (55.2 %) (44.8 %)   
15% $10,000 5,520 4,480 $ (27)** $ 668** 
      
  (59.1 %) (40.9 %)   
15% $20,000 11,820 8,180 1,061 388 
      
  (63.7 %) (36.3 %)   
15% $37,500 23,888 13,612 3,686 221 
      
  (63.3 %) (36.7 %)   
28% $75,000 47,475 27,525 11,681 767 
      
  (66.4 %) (33.6 %)   
31% $150,000 99,600 50,400 33,607 1,583 
      
  (74.4 %) (25.6 %)   
36% $300,000 223,200 76,800 88,247 5,405 
      
  (77.1 %) (22.9 %)   
39.6% $600,000 462,600 137,400 207,357 13,127 
      
  (67.6 %) (32.4 %)   
Overall avg. $74,485 50,375 24,110 11,527 311 
      
* Source: Data derived from “Comparing Salaries and wages of Women Shown on Forms W-2 to    
                Those of Men, 1969 – 1999”, p.283, IRS, SOI, Jan 2004. 
** Due to Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 
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Exhibit 8 
 
Impact of MPT (MBT) Within Classes of Income 
by Marginal Tax Bracket, No Dependents 
[2003 tax rates] 
Married Filing Jointly (MFJ) vs Separately (as Single) 
 
  
2003 
Marg. 
Tax 
Brack. 
% 
Combined 
Wages 
 
Spouse 
1 
 
Husband 
 
(% split)* 
$ split 
Spouse 
2 
 
Wife 
 
(% split)* 
$ split 
Tax liab. 
M F J 
 
 
 
Tax due 
(refund) 
MPT or (MBT)  
 
M F J vs Single  
  
 
Assume both taxpayers file 
Single + 0 dep 
      
  (55.2 %) (44.8 %)   
10% $10,000 5,520 4,480 $ (169)** $ 555** 
      
  (59.1 %) (40.9 %)   
10% $20,000 11,820 8,180 443 235 
      
  (63.7 %) (36.3 %)   
15% $37,500 23,888 13,612 2,589 (55) 
      
  (63.3 %) (36.7 %)   
25% $75,000 47,475 27,525 8,476 (862) 
      
  (66.4 %) (33.6 %)   
28% $150,000 99,600 50,400 27,813 (110) 
      
  (74.4 %) (25.6 %)   
33% $300,000 223,200 76,800 76,787 3,377 
      
  (77.1 %) (22.9 %)   
35% $600,000 462,600 137,400 181,882 9,268 
      
  (67.6 %) (32.4 %)   
Overall avg. $74,485 50,375 24,110 8,339 (1,214) 
      
* Source: Data derived from “Comparing Salaries and wages of Women Shown on Forms W-2 to    
                Those of Men, 1969 – 1999”, p.283, IRS, SOI, Jan 2004. 
** Due to Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 
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Exhibit 9 
 
Year 2000 Vs. Year 2003 MPT (MBT) Within Classes of Income 
by Marginal Tax Bracket, No Dependents 
[Married Filing Jointly vs Separately (as Single)] 
 
 
Net MPT or (MBT) 
 
M F J vs Single 
Assume both taxpayers file 
Single + 0 dep 
 
2003 
Marg. 
Tax 
Brack. 
% 
 
 
 
Combined 
Wages 
 
 
Spouse 
1 
 
Husband 
(% split)* 
$ split 
Spouse 
2 
 
Wife 
(% split)* 
$ split 
 
Year 
2000 
 
Year 
2003 
 
  
Net change 
in MPT  
       
  (55.2 %) (44.8 %)    
10% $10,000 5,520 4,480 $ 668** $ 555** (113) 
       
  (59.1 %) (40.9 %)    
10% $20,000 11,820 8,180 388 235 (153) 
       
  (63.7 %) (36.3 %)    
15% $37,500 23,888 13,612 221 (55) (276) 
       
  (63.3 %) (36.7 %)    
25% $75,000 47,475 27,525 767 (862) (1,629) 
       
  (66.4 %) (33.6 %)    
28% $150,000 99,600 50,400 1,583 (110) (1,693) 
       
  (74.4 %) (25.6 %)    
33% $300,000 223,200 76,800 5,405 3,377 (2,028) 
       
  (77.1 %) (22.9 %)    
35% $600,000 462,600 137,400 13,127 9,268 (3,859) 
       
  (67.6 %) (32.4 %)    
Overall avg. $74,485 50,375 24,110 311 (1,214) (1,525) 
       
* Source: Data derived from “Comparing Salaries and wages of Women Shown on Forms W-2 to    
                Those of Men, 1969 – 1999”, p.283, IRS, SOI, Jan 2004. 
** Due to Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 
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Exhibit 10 
 
MPT (MBT) in 2000, 2003, and Net Change Within Classes of Income 
Extrapolated to the Population by Year and by Interval 
 
 
Tax Year 2000 
 
Tax Year 2003 
 
Net Change in MPT 
 
Combined 
Wages 
 
Net 
MPT 
(MBT) 
by 
Interval 
 
Extrapolated 
Impact to 
Population by 
Interval 
 
Net 
MPT 
(MBT) 
by 
Interval 
 
Extrapolated 
Impact to 
Population by 
Interval 
 
Net 
Change 
(Decrease) 
 
Extrapolated 
Impact to 
Population by 
Interval 
       
       
$10,000 $ 668* $ 935,707,680 $ 555* $ 777,421,800 $ (113) $ (158,285,880) 
       
       
$20,000 388 1,057,300,776 235 640,375,470 (153) (416,925,306) 
       
       
$37,500 221 2,186,189,681 (55) (544,074,355) (276) (2,730,264,036) 
       
       
$75,000 767 12,018,011,785 (862) (13,506,553,010) (1,629) (25,524,564,795) 
       
       
$150,000 1,583 8,228,044,582 (110) (571,752,940) (1,693) (8,799,797,522) 
       
       
$300,000 5,405 4,617,963,537 3,377 2,885,266,025 (2,028) (1,732,697,512) 
       
       
$600,000 13,127 8,632,704,634 9,268 6,094,911,751 (3,859) (2,537,792,884) 
       
       
Totals  $ 37,675,922,675  ($ 4,224,405,260)  ($ 41,900,327,935) 
       
       
* Due to Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 
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